‘Whose prisoners are these anyway?’ Church, state and society partnerships and co-production of offender ‘resocialisation’ in Brazil by Macaulay, Fiona
 12  ‘Whose prisoners are these anyway?’ 
 Church, state and society partnerships and 
co-production of offender ‘resocialisation’ 
in Brazil 
 Fiona  Macaulay 
 Brazil’s prisons frequently hit the headlines of the international press for all 
the wrong reasons. In the latest episode of systemic violence, in December 
2013, an attempt by state police to regain control of the lawless Pedrinhas 
penitentiary in the northeastern state of Maranh ã o resulted in inmates 
unleashing violence outside and inside the prison. 1 In four buses burned out 
in the state capital by their criminal associates, a six-year-old girl died, and 
inside the jail three inmates from a rival gang were decapitated. Filmed on an 
inmate’s phone, leaked footage of the latter went around the world. But not all 
of Brazil’s prisons have fallen prey to gang control, or generate such violence, 
whether between prisoners, prisoners and staff, or prisoners and the local 
community. Indeed, some are almost the mirror images of such hellholes, are 
innovative in terms of their approach to administration and rehabilitation, 
and have even prompted international imitation. 
 This chapter complements Sacha Darke’s ( Chapter 13 ) in exploring the 
particularities and lessons that can be learned from a small group of prisons – 
the so-called Resocialisation Centres ( Centros de Ressocializa çã o – CRs) in 
S ã o Paulo state, a variant of the APAC prisons in Minas Gerais state that 
he analyses. 2 Both CRs and APACs are unusual, not just in the Brazilian or 
Latin American context, but also in terms of modern penal institutions over-
all. They are compliant with domestic and international human rights norms 
for the treatment of detainees, and have experienced no riots, little violence 
and very few escapes, despite operating with low security. They apparently 
 1  In 2013 over 60 prisoners were murdered by their fellow inmates in this high security prison. 
Designed for 1,700 prisoners, it currently holds 2,200, but this represents an average level of 
overcrowding in Brazilian prisons. 
 2  I fi rst encountered prisons (in Pernambuco and Minas Gerais) run broadly according to the 
APAC ethos, or by the APAC organisation, in 1997 while researching prison conditions in 
Brazil for Amnesty International. A grant from the Socio-Legal Studies Association allowed 
me to spend several days in each of four CRs in October 2004, using semi-structured interviews 
and focus groups with the inmates, families, prison service and NGO staff, criminal justice sys-
tem operators and opinion-formers in the local community. Access became diffi cult after 2006, 
so I began researching the APACs in Minas Gerais in 2007, and in July 2013 accompanied the 
prison authority team in Paran á state setting up new APACs. 
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achieve high levels of desistance, successfully reintegrate offenders back into 
their families and communities, and operate at around one-third to one-half  
the per capita cost of state-run prisons and commercially contracted-out 
facilities. 
 But there are two key differences between the CRs and APACs. The fi rst 
is that the Catholic-run APACs make religious faith a central plank in their 
very explicit and prescriptive ‘method’. The second is that the APACs are run 
entirely by volunteers and the prisoners themselves, without police or guards 
inside or outside the facility. The CRs, however, are run in a formal  partner-
ship between the state and local civil society, and the former provides both 
guards and key administrative posts in the units. These differences, apparently 
minor on the surface, reveal an underlying tussle over who can lay claim to 
the body and soul of the offender. The state, against whose laws they formally 
transgress? The community, which suffers fear of crime and disorder, and the 
family, which has to bear broken relationships? Or the Church, whose task is 
to save a sinner for God? In this regard the APAC franchise’s insistence on a 
religiously saturated environment and the absence of the state is a challenge 
on two fronts, not just to the predominant prison culture of simultaneous 
state absence and violence (what Agamben refers to as ‘bare life’ and inmates 
call  o sistema – ‘the system’), 3 but also to the inherent capacity of the state 
prison authorities to enact and embody a more humane set of values, and 
to cede some control over the offender to civil society. This chapter exam-
ines the rise and fall from favour of the state-run CRs, whose operation both 
challenged the dominant prison system but also aimed at its perfectability, in 
order to explore these issues of contested ‘ownership’ and the potential of the 
state to improve the ‘moral performance’ of its penal institutions. 4 
 The Brazilian prison system 
 A diversity of prison cultures is only to be expected in a country of such 
continental dimensions as Brazil. As of December 2012, Brazil’s prison 
population – now the fourth largest in the world – stood at 548,003, distributed 
between its 26 states and Federal District, and held in 470 penitentiaries, 74 
farm/factory prisons attached to 64 open prisons, 16 half-way houses, 821 
public jails (intended for remand prisoners but frequently holding convicted 
prisoners for their full term) and 33 secure psychiatric units. Some 34,290 
detainees were held in custody in police stations and police-run lock-ups and 
remand facilities. Brazil’s prison population doubled in a decade, and, like 
many other developing countries, authorities have been desperately looking 
for transnational models to cope with a constant infl ux of inmates generated 
 3  Giorgio Agamben,  Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1998). 
 4  Alison Liebling,  Prisons and their Moral Performance: A Study of Values, Quality and Prison 
Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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by a combination of rising common and drug-related crime, and harsh laws 
and sentencing practices. 5 To this end, Brazilian prison authorities built more 
prisons overall, and constructed a new generation of ‘super-max’ facilities 
(both state-run and federal) to handle violent organised crime. It also turned 
to the private sector to partially run and, more recently, fi nance and build 
prisons, through public–private partnership agreements. The government also 
attempted to divert and decarcerate more minor offenders, through the use of 
non-custodial sentences and diversionary measures such as community service 
and attendance at drug courts. Whilst the penal code is federal law, however, 
the organisation and running of the prison system falls largely within the 
remit of the 27 sub-national administrations, with the federal government 
providing only matched funding for prison construction and guidelines for 
management, rehabilitation, staff  training and so forth. The emergence of 
multiple and distinctive penal regimes and models, including the APACs and 
CRs which swim against the punitive tide, is a function both of the specifi cities 
of Brazil’s administrative structure (decentralisation) and historical political 
context (authoritarian rule and transition to democracy), and of the way in 
which these produced a certain confi guration of civil society, and state–civil 
society relations. 
 From APACs to CRs 
 In 1972 Brazil was in the eighth year of a military dictatorship. The repressive 
forces of the state were far more interested in arresting ‘subversives’ than in the 
control of common crime. Civil society was cowed by draconian legislation, 
and the Catholic Church as an institution, along with its international human 
rights allies, focused on the regime’s political torture and abuse. Nobody cared 
about prison conditions for ordinary detainees. 6 So, as Darke notes, when 
Catholic laymen, led by Dr Ottoboni, attempted to improve conditions in their 
town’s decrepit and overcrowded police lockup, the state justice authorities 
were indifferent, and the local police ambivalent. The NGO they set up with 
the acronym APAC (which initially stood for  Amando ao Pr ó ximo, Amar á s a 
Cristo – By Loving Your Neighbour You Will Love Christ) 7 fi rst took over 
 5  Fiona Macaulay, ‘Modes of Prison Administration, Control and Governmentality in Latin 
America: Adoption, Adaptation and Hybridity’,  Confl ict, Security and Development 13, no. 4 
(2013), 361–92. 
 6  Honourable exceptions are two pioneering ethnographic studies of individual prisons: Jos é 
Ricardo Ramalho,  Mundo do crime: a ordem pelo avesso [The World of Crime: Order Turned 
Upside Down] (Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 1979) is a study of the S ã o Paulo House of Detention, 
Brazil’s – and Latin America’s – largest prison; and Julita Lemgruber,  Cemit é rio dos vivos: 
an á lise sociol ó gica de uma pris ã o de mulheres [Cemetery of the Living: A Sociological Analysis 
of a Women’s Prison] (Rio de Janeiro: Achiam é , 1983), a study of the Talavera Bruce women’s 
prison in Rio de Janeiro. 
 7  Over the years the acronym has stood for a number of very slightly different names. Some 
confusion is caused by some of the NGOs working in the CRs in S ã o Paulo state having 
adopted the APAC acronym, whereas the Minas Gerais group see themselves as the ‘true’, 
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from the police the provision of services to the prisoners, and then built and 
ran a new wing for 75 prisoners on day-release schemes. Closed down for 
fi ve years due to police brutality and hostility, the prison reopened in 1984, 
this time under the APAC group’s sole control. Another APAC group also 
established itself  in Ita ú na in Minas Gerais state in the mid-1980s, formalised 
its running of the local jail in 1991, and began to attract attention in the 
mid-1990s. As the prison population soared and riots and breakouts became 
weekly occurrences in the police lock-ups and jails, the National Congress 
conducted a parliamentary inquiry and the Brazilian Catholic Church 
launched a campaign on prison conditions. 
 The APAC model was also replicated, but in signifi cantly modifi ed form, 
in another jail (Bragan ç a Paulista) in S ã o Paulo state when Dr Nagashi 
Furukawa, then the local judge, helped a group of local volunteers to sign 
a partnership agreement with the state in 1996. 8 Once appointed head of the 
state’s prison system in 1999, in large part on the basis of his advocacy of this 
model, he established a total of 22 such prisons, mostly purpose-built, which 
he called CRs, each holding around 210 prisoners and jointly run by the state 
and a local NGO. Meanwhile the original, religiously-based APAC group 
moved its headquarters to Minas Gerais state. 9 Thus, by the early 2000s, the 
CRs constituted numerically the largest group of prisons run in formal part-
nership between the state and civil society. 
 In 2006, however, Furukawa was forced to resign from his post following 
an extraordinary show of force by the  Primeiro Comando da Capital (‘First 
Capital Command’, PCC), an organisation that functions both as an inmates’ 
union and organised crime network. The PCC has managed to penetrate most 
of the state’s prisons following its foundation in the early 1990s. 10 In response 
faith-based APAC. Many of the facilities run by the ‘true’ APAC group are also referred to as 
Resocialisation Centres, adding to further muddling of the two strands. 
 8  An NGO with the name  Associa çã o de Prote çã o e Assist ê ncia ao Condenado (Association for 
the Protection and Assistance of the Convicted Prisoner), set up in 1978 by concerned citizens 
in Bragan ç a Paulista, was blocked by the local judge but revived in 1993 by individuals linked 
to the justice system, including the prosecution service, Bar Association, Civil Police and the 
Community Council (a civil society oversight body linked to the court). 
 9  This move occurred in part because the original APAC, in S ã o Jos é dos Campos, was closed 
down in 1999, and later reopened as a CR, that is, in partnership with the state rather than 
being under the full control of the APAC group. 
 10  Within the PCC there are various foundational myths about when (between 1989 and 1993) and 
in which prison it was founded. (Karina Biondi,  Junto e misturado: Uma etnografi a do PCC 
[Mixed Together: An ethnography of the PCC] (S ã o Paulo: Editora Terceiro Nome, 2010), 
69–70). What seems clear, however, is that it quickly garnered support among the prison popu-
lation due to the brutality of the prison system, such as the extrajudicial execution by military 
police of 111 prisoners who had surrendered after a riot in the House of Detention in 1992, the 
harsh super-maximum security conditions in Taubat é prison (a unit for disruptive inmates), 
and the violent anarchy permitted to reign in the prisons. The PCC set out a statute governing 
prisoners’ relations with one another, and with the authorities. Inmates opt to join the PCC 
and to take on leadership and bargaining/confl ict resolution roles, but all those in ‘PCC pris-
ons’ are expected to adhere to their rules. Camila Caldeira Nunes Dias,  PCC: Hegemonia nas 
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to the authorities’ intention to isolate gang leaders, it unleashed a wave of vio-
lence in the city, killing dozens of police and prison guards, attacking criminal 
justice and economic targets, and paralysing the city, and coordinated riots 
across 82 prisons in S ã o Paulo state alone. His successor in the post, Ant ô nio 
Ferreira Pinto, was a former military police offi cer and criminal prosecutor. 
A hardliner, he expressed a visceral dislike of the CR experiment, both for 
its perceived ‘soft’ approach to prisoners and the involvement of non-state 
actors, 11 and leaked to the press ‘evidence’ of ‘irregularities’ committed by the 
NGOs, aimed at discrediting them and their champion. 12 
 It was not politically possible to close the CRs down, however, given that 
they had received the strong backing of the previous state governor, whose 
successor was from the same party. As a result, the new director of the prison 
service opted simply not to renew the contracts of the partner NGOs, with 
the result that as of early 2014 nine CRs had reverted to state control with 
no local community involvement. In the meantime, as Darke indicates, the 
‘original’ faith-based APAC model has expanded in Minas Gerais, backed by 
senior justices, and in states further afi eld. The CR experience is now largely 
forgotten and unknown in a state in which most prisons are controlled on a 
day-to-day basis by the PCC. 13 
 Religious civil society and the state 
 The core disagreement between Ottoboni and Furukawa, the originators of 
the APAC and CR approaches, concerns the role of religion and of the state 
in the rehabilitation of the offender, an old debate in historical, comparative 
terms. The monopolisation of the punishment function by the state, wrested 
from the sovereign and from private individuals, is a feature of modern penal 
systems. However, as the modern carceral institutions emerged in the United 
States, Europe and Latin America from the late eighteenth century, in certain 
locations religious organisations were involved in shaping and running some 
penal institutions, both complementing and substituting for the state, and 
then, eventually, competing with the secular authorities both to control the 
ethos and running of these facilities and to determine the fate of inmates. 
Quakers designed and ran the fi rst penitentiaries in the United States – 
Newgate in New York and the Walnut Street jail in Philadelphia – whilst in 
Latin America separate women’s penitentiaries were often run by orders of 
pris õ es e monop ó lio da viol ê ncia [PCC: Hegemony in the Prisons and Monopoly of Violence] 
(S ã o Paulo: Editora Saraiva, 2013). 
 11  Interview with Ant ô nio Ferreira Pinto, July 2007. 
 12  Dr Furukawa claimed these allegations as either untrue, or the facts had been twisted to 
smear him and his administration. Interview July 2007 and ‘Furukawa diz que apurou 
irregularidades em presidios de SP’, 7 December 2006,  http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/
Brasil/0,,AA1378554-5598,00.html . 
 13  The CRs are specifi cally intended for those who want to avoid gang involvement. A few other 
prisons, for example those for sex offenders, host rivals to the PCC. 
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nuns in the nineteenth century. 14 But in all cases tensions around disciplinary 
power over offenders were resolved in favour of the consolidation of state 
penal authority. 
 Civil society was slower to develop in Brazil than in North America and 
Europe, although intellectuals from the legal fi eld were concerned with the 
proper modernisation of the prison system. S ã o Paulo’s state penitentiary, 
built in the 1920s, was hailed as a model institution, attracting visitors from 
far afi eld. 15 However, after decades of political upheaval and gradual decline 
of this ideal of modernity, it was not until the democratic transition of the 
1980s that prisoners again attracted attention, fi rst from religious civil soci-
ety. Throughout the dictatorship, a liberal Catholic Church had provided a 
space for the defence of diverse vulnerable groups, and in 1986 the Brazilian 
Conference of Bishops set up the prison pastoral service ( Pastoral Carcer á rio ), 
which was legally constituted in 1988. The Pastoral, however, saw its main 
role, alongside other civil society groups, as one of advocacy and defence 
of prisoners’  human rights , for which the guarantor had to be a perfectible, 
democratic state. As such, the Pastoral refrained from proselytising and has 
been very ambivalent about taking over the running of prisons, seeing this as 
the function of the state within the rule-of-law. Indeed, at times it has regarded 
Ottoboni’s APAC group with some suspicion. 16 That said, Brazil’s size and 
the decentralised operation of the Pastoral have allowed for variation. In 1996 
the coordinator of the Pastoral in Pernambuco state, a doctor, stepped in as 
director of the then relatively small Juiz Pl á cido de Souza prison in Caruaru, 
taking over from a string of military police directors. Notably, the Pastoral 
group there was composed of individuals with a background of liberal/left 
 political militancy and mixed, or no, religious belief  or affi liation. The way 
that this director, and his successor, a former prison guard, ran the prison was 
much more akin to the secular, partnership-based ethos of the CRs than that 
of Ottoboni’s APACs. 
 The very presence of the grassroots Catholic APAC model in prisons, 
however, seems to have suggested to the established Church that this was a 
sphere in which it  should intervene. In Minas Gerais the fi rst ever purpose-
built APAC prison opened in Santa Luzia in 2006, sponsored by the Pontifi cal 
Catholic University, the Archdiocese and the Pastoral in Belo Horizonte. 17 
 14  Carlos Aguirre, ‘Prisons and Prisoners in Modernising Latin America (1800–1940)’, in  Cultures 
of Confi nement: A History of the Prison in Africa, Asia and Latin America , ed. Frank Dik ö tter 
and Ian Brown (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 27. 
 15  Fernando Salla,  As pris õ es em S ã o Paulo 1822–1940 [Prisons in S ã o Paulo 1822–1940] (S ã o 
Paulo: Anna Blume/FAPESP, 1999), 196. 
 16  This was certainly the view expressed to me in the late 1990s by Padre Francisco ‘Chico’ 
Reardon, late coordinator of the Pastoral, and by his successors. 
 17  Possibly the APAC venture has attracted both Church and government support in Minas 
Gerais because of the higher level of expressed Catholicism there (73 per cent, compared to 66 
per cent in S ã o Paulo, according to the 2010 Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics 
survey). The most Catholic states are in the under-developed northeast, with the exception of 
Pernambuco whose level of Catholic adherence is similar to S ã o Paulo’s. Minas Gerais was the 
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This involvement should be read within a dynamic context in which Christian 
groups, both orthodox Catholic and evangelical Protestant, have become more 
infl uential in political life and social welfare administration, both cooperat-
ing and competing with each other. 18 Pentecostalism has also been displacing 
Catholicism in Brazil in recent decades, with data suggesting that a quarter of 
the Brazilian population now identifi es itself  as ‘born again’ Christians, rising 
to over 50 per cent in some urban areas. Pentecostal churches recruit success-
fully in prisons, not least because they offer adherents exemption from the 
rules, rites and violence of the wider prison system. 19 However, Pentecostal 
groups have restricted themselves thus far to providing welfare and material 
support to inmates, and have not attempted to collaborate formally with, or 
substitute for, the state. 
 This tension between the offi cially secular character of the Brazilian state 
and the reality of variable and diverse forms of religiosity in society at large, 
and among decision-makers, will probably, as Darke notes, affect the spread 
of APACs, with some local actors embracing or rejecting it precisely on these 
grounds. Ottoboni’s criticism of Furukawa’s CRs for lacking ‘methodology’ 
(the 12 components listed by Darke) is actually an attack on its secularism. 20 
Indeed, despite the CRs’ consistency of practice, achieved through the train-
ing of new staff  and NGO personnel, there was no manual, written method-
ology or explicit analytical framework. All the CRs had some autonomy to 
interpret and implement the core elements, for example by adopting slightly 
differing internal routines and disciplinary rules, allowing the staff, NGO per-
sonnel and, importantly, the prisoners themselves some creativity and latitude 
in responding to the socio-economic characteristics of the locality and the 
offenders they took in. 21 The failure of the CRs to articulate explicitly their 
only state where, in colonial times, Portugal prohibited convents and monasteries, leaving the 
running of everyday religious practice in the hands of brotherhoods of lay people. See Caio 
C é sar Boschi,  Os leigos e o poder: irmandades leigas e pol í tica colonizadora em Minas Gerais 
[Laypeople and Power: Lay Brotherhoods and Colonising Policy in Minas Gerais] (S ã o Paulo: 
Editora  Á tica, 1986). It is, of course, hard to prove whether this has left a cultural trace that 
made key actors in that state more receptive to the APAC model of lay engagement. 
 18  The parliamentary cross-bench evangelical group has grown considerably in the last decade, 
now standing at 70 out of 513 federal deputies and three out of 81 senators. 
 19  Camila Caldeira Nunes Dias,  A igreja como ref ú gio e a b í blia como esconderijo: Religi ã o e 
viol ê ncia na pris ã o [The Church as Refuge and the Bible as Bolt-hole] (S ã o Paulo: Editora 
Humanitas, 2008). Some prisons may see the presence of a single Pentecostal, or fundamen-
talist church, whilst others may have several. Pastors may visit frequently to conduct religious 
services, whilst followers inside often self-segregate in their own cells or wings. 
 20  This methodology is contained in the writings of its ideologue Dr M á rio Ottoboni,  Vamos 
matar o criminoso? M é todo APAC [Are We Going to Kill the Criminal? The APAC Method] 
(S ã o Paulo: Paulinas, 2001);  Ningu é m e irrecuper á vel [No One is Irredeemable] (S ã o Paulo: 
Cidade Nova, 2001);  Seja solu çã o, n ã o v í tima! Justi ç a restaurativa, uma abordagem inovadora 
[Be the Solution, not a Victim! Restorative Justice, an Innovative Approach] (S ã o Paulo: 
Cidade Nova, 2004). 
 21  For example, the internal standing orders in the Sumar é CR were drafted by prisoners and 
staff  together, and could be modifi ed after consultation with both. 
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own, non-religious modus operandi, however, has meant that this alternative 
path for state–society collaboration has undermined the wider resonance of 
this model. 
 State and society: invited participation, co-production, substitution 
 The CR partnership approach is in fact consistent with, and extends, the 
forms of collaboration between state and civil society on social policy issues 
that were made possible, even mandated, by the 1988 Constitution. The latter 
created spaces of ‘invited participation’ in the form of Management Councils 
jointly composed of civil society and state representatives. 22 Some, often those 
dealing with specifi c social groups (disabled, elderly, women, blacks), have a 
largely watchdog role that involves monitoring the state and its protection 
of rights, whilst others in the areas of health, welfare, housing and youth 
police have a more deliberative role aimed at modifying bills in the relevant 
legislature, shaping state policy, and ensuring it is implemented. They do 
not actually ‘co-produce’ the public good they monitor, however, as the CR 
partnerships do, in the sense of signing a formal partnership with the state 
and actually delivering the service (in this case, offender rehabilitation) inside 
the state institutions. Criminal justice has also traditionally been the social 
policy area most closed to civil society input due to its association with the 
‘security’ concerns of the state. The only civil society groups akin to these 
Management Councils with a legal remit for involvement in prison matters 
are the so-called Community Councils ( Conselhos da Comunidade ), which 
emerged from the Brazilian state’s attempts to bring the country’s penal 
systems into line with international human rights norms. The 1984 national 
Sentence Serving Law ( Lei de Execu çã o Penal ) provides for such bodies in 
any jurisdiction with a prison. However, many areas still have no such prison 
community councils as they can be set up only by the local judge, and receive 
little institutional support. There is also an increasing tendency to downgrade 
their rather unclear watchdog role (some had been very active in inspecting, 
then publicly decrying human rights abuses in, local prisons), a role now played 
in civil society by the Pastoral and the Brazilian Bar Association. Increasingly 
criminal justice actors seems to be emphasising their ‘gap-fi lling’ role, that is, 
providing material and human welfare assistance to prisons where the state 
cannot meet needs, which is only one of their four legal functions. 23 
 22  Andrea Cornwall, ‘New Democratic Spaces: The Politics and Dynamics of Institutionalised 
Participation’,  IDS Bulletin 35, no. 2 (2004), 1–10. 
 23  They are required to visit prisons monthly, interview inmates and report to the state-level 
Prison Council (also of mixed state–civil society composition, which handles issues such as 
parole applications) and the local judge. However, it is not specifi ed to what end they should 
do this. Maria Palma Wolff, ‘Participa çã o social e sistema penitenci á rio: uma parceria vi á vel?’ 
[Social Participation and the Prison System: A Viable Partnership?] Unpublished paper avail-
able on Ministry of Justice website:  http://tinyurl.com/qyq5kuw . 
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 The CR partnership with the state in offender rehabilitation highlights the 
philosophical difference between the Ottoboni and Furukawa models regard-
ing the nature and ‘redeemability’ of the state, and whether such collaboration 
constitutes a radical challenge to the state monopoly on force and disciplinary 
power, or simply co-opts civil society into a hegemonic, essentially neoliberal, 
project of mass incarceration. The literature on co-production of public ser-
vices suggests such a divergence of views, with one strand stressing ‘equal and 
reciprocal’ relations between professionals, service users, family and commu-
nity, 24 whilst another sees it as a means for the public sector and citizens to 
make best use of one another’s resources in the pursuit of effi ciency (lowered 
costs) and effectiveness (better outcomes). 
 In this instance, co-production has certainly reduced the cost of incarcer-
ation to the state. The APACs and CRs are much cheaper than prisons run 
entirely by the state because the NGOs are free from certain constraints such 
as the tendering arrangements that tie the state authorities to ‘preferred sup-
pliers’ and in turn infl ate costs and encourage backhanders. They buy cheaper 
and better goods and services from local businesses, thus contributing to the 
local economy, and can switch suppliers when necessary. Their staff  members 
are also not state employees, whose protections under Brazilian labour law 
makes them very hard to dismiss, even when they fail to fulfi l their contracts, as 
is the case with many hourly-contracted professionals in prisons, such as doc-
tors. These same advantages are, of course, also held by commercial compan-
ies that have entered into partnerships with the prison authorities. However, 
greater fl exibility in purchasing and contracting is offset in the private sector 
by the need to generate profi t, so there is very mixed evidence in Brazil as to 
whether operating costs in semi-privatised prisons are actually lower than in 
the state sector. 25 By contrast the NGOs are driven by non-economic, moral 
factors. They take pride in their careful guardianship of resources, reinvest-
ing any surplus in improved services to prisoners. Cost reductions are also 
possible because as community-based organisations they are more persuasive 
in seeking free donations of food or material. The relationship between the 
two partners of  gest ã o compartilhada or  co-gest ã o [shared administration or 
co-administration] thus provides not just a division of labour but also a value-
added element through the synergy that can be achieved through the distinct-
ive contributions of both. 
 The CRs, at least, were also subject to strict systems of accountability on 
the part of the state authorities. In their heyday Dr Furukawa considered 
having the NGOs take on the administration – not the rehabilitative ser-
vices – of nearby large penitentiaries simply to reduce costs. This proposal, 
however, prompted the APAC groups to criticise the CR partnerships as con-
stituting privatisation by another name. Indeed, the division of labour in the 
 24  New Economic Foundation,  Co-Production: A Manifesto for Growing the Core Economy 
(London: New Economics Foundation, 2008). 
 25  Macaulay, ‘Modes of Prison Administration’, 374–5. 
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partnership arrangement does resemble the European form of semi-privati-
sation in which the state provides the prison guards and authorities, but not 
the rehabilitative and ‘hotel’ services. Yet, it does not go as far as the ‘hybrid’ 
form of contracted-out prisons in Brazil whereby guards are also supplied by 
the private company but the state maintains a supervisory presence inside the 
prison, appointing state employees to the post of warden, deputy warden and 
head of discipline, as a minimum. 26 
 Further, the Ottoboni-ite APACs also make an especial virtue of volun-
tarism, whereby the key rehabilitative services – education, healthcare, psy-
chological support, social work, legal aid – should be provided by volunteers 
from the community, with the directors of the facility as the only paid staff. In 
addition, they prefer to receive donations from local businesses to meet their 
running costs. On two occasions, however, this arrangement jeopardised the 
sustainability of their fl agship facilities and so they were forced, reluctantly, 
to accept fi nancial support from the state prison authorities. This depend-
ency on the state goes against their autonomist inclinations, but in a country 
such as Brazil, where there are still considerable gaps in welfare coverage and 
which has a limited history of philanthropy, demands on local civil society 
are multiple and draining and often make collaboration with the state and its 
resources inevitable. 27 
 Competition with the criminal justice system 
 The lower running costs and greater effectiveness and effi ciency of the CRs 
was insuffi cient in itself, however, to sell the model to sceptical state criminal 
justice operators whose cooperation with this project of rehumanising and 
resocialising the offender is also required. Conventional criminal justice 
systems are state-centric. The State determines the nature of ‘crime’ through 
legislation, and offenders are deemed to have wronged the state. Whilst the 
CRs allow the local community to assert its interest in the fate of its ‘own’ 
offenders, it also brings the NGOs into confl ict with the state, which retains 
legal responsibility for the custody of the offender. Moreover, the different 
branches of the state also compete for disciplinary power over the prisoner. 
Although the executive branch is responsible for the arrest of offenders, it is 
the judiciary that prosecutes, in most cases passes sentences, and then oversees 
the serving of that sentence in Brazil. Indeed the 1984 Sentence Serving 
 26  Sandro Cabral, Sergio G. Lazzarini and Paulo Furquim de Azevedo, ‘Private Entrepreneurs 
in Public Services: A Longitudinal Examination of Outsourcing and Statization of Prisons’, 
 Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal 7, no. 1 (2013), 6–25. Brazil’s is the sixth largest economy in 
the world but is ranked eighty-fi fth on the Human Giving Index and eighty-third on the World 
Giving Index. 
 27  Alex Segura Ubiergo, in  The Political Economy of the Welfare State in Latin America 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) characterises Brazil’s welfare as ambitious 
and egalitarian in intent, but with ‘limited effi ciency and high regressivity’ in practice (29, 
footnote 17). 
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Law (LEP) specifi cally ‘judicialised’ prison sentences, with the intention 
that judicial oversight would guarantee fair treatment of detainees. But Dr 
Furukawa’s term in offi ce saw a ‘dejudicialisation’ process, as he argued that 
certain rights to which prisoners were entitled, such as progression from a 
closed to a semi-open prison regime, parole or fi nal release were not being 
granted on the basis of objective criteria, such as time served, but rather at 
the discretion of the local judges responsible for the correct serving of the 
sentence. In particular, Furukawa abolished the legal requirement for these 
local judges to base their decisions in these matters on a formal assessment 
conducted by a psychologist or social worker who had never met the offender 
before. This was replaced by a similar assessment carried out by prison and 
NGO staff  in the CR, who then sent their recommendation to the judge. 28 But 
this created a problem. The principle in the LEP of ‘individualised sentences’ 
requires subjective assessments of the prisoner’s progress. However, the judge, 
NGO technical staff  and CR prison administration (Director and the Head of 
Discipline) all believed that  their judgement was the one that should prevail, 
and this led to frequent differences of opinion. Divisions arose because the 
judge continued to hold  legal responsibility for the prisoner, the state prison 
authorities had  security concerns with regard to offenders, whilst the NGOs 
believed they had been handed the  moral responsibility for offenders under 
the terms of the contract with the authorities. Thus the presence of state 
agents and civil society actors on an apparently equal footing within the CR 
prisons generated contests that are absent within the APACs run without 
state agents. As Darke notes, the APACs have managed to establish a penal 
space within which the volunteers and the prisoners themselves determine the 
progress made by an offender, and have pushed state criminal justice system 
operators to the margins. 
 Criminal justice system operators seemed to divide into two groups in rela-
tion to the CRs. Some local judges were very enthusiastic and were instru-
mental in bringing the community into the local jails, fi rst through the APAC 
groups and then through the establishment of a CR. Others, however, were 
indifferent or even hostile, especially in S ã o Paulo state. Each new CR had 
a purpose-built room where judges could come and conduct pre-trial hear-
ings or deal with business related to sentencing, such as approving sentence 
remission, exeats, parole or regime progression. This was intended to cut out 
the need for police escorts to take prisoners to court, freeing police for other 
duties, and allowing judges to be more effi cient. In a number of cases the 
judges refused to set foot in the CR, however, preferring to stay in their own 
territory and maintaining their social distance from the inmates. Similarly, 
many local judges and prosecutors failed to carry out the monthly visits to 
penal facilities under their jurisdiction that are required by the LEP and were 
entirely ignorant of the work of the CRs. This is partly due to a technical-
 28  Interview with Dr Furukawa, October 2004. 
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bureaucratic understanding of their responsibilities in relation to prisoners, 
which ignores the substantive element of ensuring that offenders are rehabili-
tated, as the LEP demands. 29 It may also be a characteristic of the post of 
the judge responsible for overseeing sentence serving, which some appeared 
to view as an undemanding sinecure. 30 In the APAC prisons in Minas Gerais, 
however, the upper echelons of the state judiciary formally support the initia-
tive, making it more diffi cult for local judges to boycott them. 31 
 Police, on the other hand, seemed to maintain an almost uniformly hostile 
attitude to the CRs, which they regarded as ‘soft’ on offenders. My fi eldwork 
in 2004, the heyday of the CRs, suggested that offi cers were the most anxious 
to maintain the stigmatisation of offenders on which, in large part, their own 
professional identities depended and allegedly wasted no opportunity to give 
inmates a reminder of their proper status. I heard accounts from prisoners 
and staff  of prisoners being beaten in the police vans on the way to court for 
hearings. Police frequently tried to reproduce what Garfi nkel calls the ‘status 
degradation ceremonies’ prevalent in the mainstream criminal justice system 
by handcuffi ng non-violent prisoners, and insisting that prisoners kept their 
eyes downcast, and refrained from interacting with the offi cials. Moreover, 
they also deliberately ‘invaded’ the CR space with police dogs, and attempted, 
through sexual innuendo and other means, to undermine the authority of 
the mainly female prison governors. This notable gender dimension was the 
result of Dr Furukawa appointing social workers or psychologists, profes-
sions with high proportions of women in Brazil, which refl ected both his 
emphasis on rehabilitation and the creation of an explicitly domestic envir-
onment that rejected the hyper-masculinity and violence of the mainstream 
prison system. 32 
 Judges, prosecutors and police are criminal justice agents largely external to 
the day-to-day running of the prison. However, the governors of the CRs also 
had the task of managing several relationships within the facilities, between 
guards and prisoners, and between the state employees and the NGO staff. 
Volunteers also claimed that they had to resocialise not only the prisoners 
but also the guards, who took about a year to adjust themselves to the CR 
culture. The guards were challenged especially by the much reduced social dis-
tance between themselves and prisoners, and by an understanding of security 
 29  In one CR, I witnessed an inspection by two representatives of the state prosecution service’s 
internal affairs department. They evinced little interest in the rehabilitative regime and effect-
iveness of the CR, being most exercised by the fact that on their monthly visits local prosecu-
tors were failing to sign a separate log from the judge, as required by the LEP. 
 30  In some jurisdictions criminal judges also fulfi l this function, whereas in larger ones judges are 
specifi cally appointed to this role. 
 31  Jane Ribeiro Silva,  A execu çã o penal  à luz do m é todo APAC [Sentence Serving in the Light of 
the APAC Method] (Belo Horizonte: Tribunal de Justi ç a do Estado de Minas Gerais, 2012). 
 32  This feminisation is less evident in the APACs, whose core leadership group is still mainly 
men. However, as the model diffuses to other locations in Brazil it is often being advocated by 
women in the justice system. 
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that relies on human interaction rather than physical barriers and the threat 
of force. Some never adapted and went back to working in the mainstream 
prison system. The rest – some of whom chose to work in the CRs; others who 
were simply transferred – generally accommodated themselves to a trade-off. 
They earned less money than in a large penitentiary (salaries are linked to 
staff/prisoner ratio and degree of risk), but benefi ted from the far less stressful 
environment and access to good food, free health services and better work-
ing conditions. Again, this problem was circumvented in the APACs, which 
have regarded state prison guards and their mentality as an obstacle to their 
method. Rather than retrain the guards they have simply replaced them with 
volunteers and trustee prisoners. This is an understandable circumvention of 
the problem. When I asked the governor of Bragan ç a Paulista CR in the early 
days whether he attributed success to good staff, he laughed, and explained he 
had six guards on a rotating shift, ‘two are drunkards, two are incompetent, 
and the other two have to keep an eye on them’. 33 
 The other issue evident in the CR model related to the NGOs and their 
relationship to the prison staff. Both the APAC and CR models are hostage to 
the variable density and character of civil society. Sometimes existing NGOs 
offered to take on the CR partnership, as was the case of a group active around 
HIV/AIDS, which was already working with prisoners as a high risk group. 
In other cases, NGOs formed out of professional and social networks, such 
as the Rotary or Lions Club and the Bar Association. In Bragan ç a Paulista, 
many of the volunteers and staff  had been work colleagues at the local branch 
of Ita ú Bank. APAC groups have a similarly heterogeneous composition, but 
increasingly include members of the criminal justice service, such as local 
prosecutors and judges. NGO members are also not immune from more 
ignoble motivations, such as personal advantage and status enhancement. 
Therefore, in all but the longest established CRs, it took time to iron out the 
tensions between the key fi gures in the prison administration, and the NGO 
as they negotiated a number of boundaries concerning discipline, security, 
‘expertise’ in regard to the prisoners, mutual accountability and oversight, 
and status. In my interviews with CR prison governors and the head of the 
NGOs, I heard frequent complaints about their counterparts. 34 The limited 
supply of interested and competent civil society groups skewed the balance in 
the early days, so that when confl icts arose between the NGO and the prison 
service staff, the head of the prison service found it easier to replace a prison 
governor, rather than look for a new NGO. This is not unconnected with 
the constraints of voluntarism in a country with uneven density of civil soci-
ety highlighted earlier, though doubtless the APAC group would argue that 
the quality control exercised over the franchise by the central APAC greatly 
reduced their instability as a partner NGO. 
 33  Field visit with Amnesty International, June 1998. 
 34  Field notes, October 2004. 
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 Community, family and the offender 
 As ideas about a ‘modern’ penal regime consolidated in the early and mid-
nineteenth century in the United States and Europe, institutions quite 
deliberately turned their backs on the surrounding communities. The chaos 
of the jails of the eighteenth century would be replaced by order, discipline, 
isolation, penitence and work. The prison was to be a place of rehabilitation 
of the prisoner’s soul, achieved precisely by  de socialising him and dramatically 
restricting his contact with other prisoners, his family, the community from 
which he came, even from the guards, for fear of contamination in both 
directions. Post-colonial Latin American states, infl uenced by European 
penal debates, articulated a similar aspiration to such practices and values, 
even if  their capacity to implement them was much weaker. 35 Localised 
practices created penal institutions that were far from being closed or total 
institutions, exposing local communities in recent years to violence (through 
riots, breakouts and crime, prisoners bribing guards to let them out at night), 
and infectious disease such as tuberculosis and HIV, spread to families and 
community on visitors’ day and on release. 36 The CRs and APACs are thus 
an attempt to turn this porosity to good ends, and resocialise the offender; 
that is, reconnect the offender and his or her community, as well as resocialise 
within the community of fellow offenders, analysed by Darke. The CRs and 
APACs donate to local nurseries, schools and hospitals the surpluses of the 
fruit and vegetables produced in their kitchen gardens, and food cooked on 
site. Some inmates are visible outside the prison, working in local businesses 
and on community projects, and some CRs, in their work with the families 
of offenders (the key criterion for transfer to a CR or APAC is that a family 
member lives nearby and is willing to engage positively), offer their health, 
education and occupational training services to the family as well. The 
level of contact between the local community and CR population varies, of 
course, and often refl ects the character of the NGO that has taken on the 
co-administration. Some are closely linked to narrow professional groups 
(such as lawyers linked to the Brazilian Bar Association), whilst others have 
a broader social base. The former tend to be more ‘professionalised’ whereas 
the latter tend to make more use of volunteer labour and donations from the 
community, forming a broader bridge. ‘The community’ is not always initially 
well disposed towards penal institutions of any type. In one town I visited, the 
local media had whipped up a mild moral panic when a CR was proposed, 
and the municipal authorities refused to offer any land. However, once the 
old jail was closed down and the new CR operating following compulsory 
purchase of land, the mayor who had so strenuously opposed it boasted 
 35  Aguirre, ‘Prisons and Prisoners in Modernising Latin America’, 18. 
 36  Visitors’ day in a Brazilian prison is a whole day affair, with families mingling freely inside the 
prison, often eating food their relative has prepared for them or they have brought in. Conjugal 
contact is routine. 
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in his campaign literature for re-election that he had been responsible for 
bringing it to the town. Attitudes towards the CRs tend to change when the 
population sees that offenders from elsewhere will not be ‘imported’ into their 
community, bringing with them an infl ux of poor families visiting or moving 
to be close to their incarcerated relatives, as would be the case with a normal 
penitentiary. An attitudinal survey demonstrated a high level of ‘ownership’ 
of offenders by people in towns with a CR, who were far less likely to agree 
with propositions such as ‘prisoners should be treated badly because they 
have done wrong’ and more likely to agree that ‘prisoners should be treated 
with humanity’, and ‘the rehabilitation of prisoners is the responsibility of 
everyone, not just of police, judges and the prison authorities’. 37 
 Conclusion 
 This analysis of the CRs, in contradistinction to both the mainstream prison 
system and its close relative, the APACs, raised questions about how ‘the 
community’, via organised civil society, in  partnership with the state, can 
reassert some ownership of the criminal justice system, from which it is largely 
excluded. Restorative justice, developed in other parts of the world, represents 
one way of rebalancing relationships between offender, state and community. 
Indeed the CRs (implicitly) and the APACs (explicitly) see restoration as a key 
aspect of resocialisation. 38 The reclamation of the offender for the community 
has been attempted in other ways, specifi cally through the complete, or partial, 
occupation of the penitentiary space. The CR experiment, in particular, is a 
liberal one that places its faith not in God’s redemption, but in the potential 
for a democratic state to deliver on justice, fairness, safety, order, humanity, 
trust and opportunities for personal development (Liebling’s measures of 
‘moral performance’), even as the Brazilian prison authorities maintain 
contradictory, but interpenetrating, penal universes where the state either 
enacts, or permits others to enact, multiple forms of violence and exclusion. 
For example, just four months before Pedrinhas prison exploded, a new APAC 
unit was set up in a wing of that prison to take prisoners eligible for a semi-
open regime. The prison system, like the police, craves society’s legitimation 
and requires its collaboration, but resists ceding power to it. However, whilst 
the dimensions of Brazil’s prison crisis may overcome the resistance of state 
agents to working with civil society, issues of partnership, power, ownership 
and ethos will remain very much a contested and negotiated terrain. 
 
 
 37  Secretaria de Administra çã o Penitenci á ria, ‘Centros de Ressocializa çã o: A quest ã o peniten-
ci á ria e a opini ã o p ú blica’ [Resocialisation Centres: The Prison Issue and Public Opinion] (S ã o 
Paulo: Governo do Estado de S ã o Paulo, 2002). 
 38  Restorative justice, as a concept, was barely known in Brazil until the late 1990s, when a num-
ber of conferences were held with international experts. It is still not much referenced with the 
criminal justice system as a whole, even when restorative practices are used – for example in 
the small claims courts when offenders have to pay fi nes, do community service or undertake 
therapy. 
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